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THE COURTESY COPY TRAP: UNTIMELY REMOVAL FROM
STATE TO FEDERAL COURT
ROBERT P. FAULKNER*
INTRODUCTION
Day 1: The scene is familiar. Seated around a conference-room
table are two antagonists (4 and B) and their attorneys. "By the
way," says A, "we filed this today-to protect ourselves." He hands
over a copy of a civil complaint filed in .4 's home state court alleging
all sorts of bad faith, breaches of duty, violations of law, and so
forth. After the shouting subsides, 4 and B resume their discussions
and agree to meet two weeks later to "see if we can settle this
thing." That meeting (on Day 14) produces no results, nor does a
second settlement negotiation a week later (Day 21). Four days
thereafter (Day 25), A formally serves B with process, thereby com-
mencing the action under state law.
Now B's lawyer takes a closer look at the complaint and sees
that it contains a federal question or two. After weighing the pros
and cons of staying in a state forum, she files a notice of removal to
federal court just one week after her client was served. But it is now
Day 32, and she is too late; the removal time has expired.
The period within which a state court defendant may remove
the action to federal court' is severely limited by the federal removal
provisions, which provide in pertinent part:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall
be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting
forth the claim for relief upon which such action or pro-
ceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of
summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has
then been filed in court and is not required to be served on
* Mr. Faulkner is an attorney with the Washington, D.C. office ofJenner & Block,
where he pursues a civil litigation practice focusing on constitutional and antitrust is-
sues. In briefs before the court in Thompson v. Telephone & Data Systems, No. 90-783-
JU (D. Or. Jan. 7, 1991) (perJuba, Mag.), aff'd without opinion, (D. Or. May 15, 1991), Mr.
Faulkner successfully argued that the case should be remanded to state court.
1. For the general provisions on removal of cases from state to federal court, see 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441-52 (1988).
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the defendant, whichever period is shorter.2
In our scenario, B filed her notice of removal more than thirty days
after receiving a so-called "courtesy copy" of the filed complaint.
Therefore, despite the natural assumption that important time peri-
ods do not commence until service, and despite the narcotic effect
of settlement negotiations on litigation planning and research, the
notice of removal is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and a fed-
eral court should, upon proper motion, remand the action to state
court.3
The issue is not that simple, however, as indicated by a host of
conflicting court decisions. This Article examines the application of
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) to those instances, such as courtesy copy cases,
in which the removal period commences before the action does.4
Part I analyzes the language of the statute and concludes that the
majority line of cases, exemplified by Tyler v. Prudential Life Insurance
Co. of America,5 correctly adopts the "Receipt Rule," which finds re-
moval untimely when the notice is filed more than thirty days after
receipt of the copy but less than thirty days after formal service of
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (emphasis added). The alternative 30-day trigger for the
removal period based on receipt of a summons applies only to those few states, such as
Kentucky, where there is no requirement that the complaint ever be served on the de-
fendant. See S. REP. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248.
This alternative removal period is outside the scope of this Article.
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
4. The academic literature is virtually silent on this subject. Indeed, several writ-
ings tend to mislead the reader into believing that timeliness of removal is a simple
inquiry. See Richard Bisio & Cynthia M. York, Changes in Federal Diversity and Removal
Jurisdiction, 68 MICH. B.J. 649 (1989) (stating inaccurately that "defendants normally
must remove a case within 30 days after service of the complaint"); Charles Rothfeld,
Rationalizing Removal, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 225 (stating confidently that "[r]emoval
procedure is fairly straightforward"); Michael T. Gibson, Private Concurrent Litigation in
Light of Younger, Pennzoil, and Colorado River, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 185, 197 n.51
(1989) (commenting inaccurately that "[a] defendant in an otherwise removable state
court case loses her right to remove by failing to file the necessary papers within 30 days
after she is served with the complaint or with a later document from which the federal
nature of the action first is ascertainable"); Edward C. DeVivo, Removal Jurisdiction, 31
TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 225, 227 (1987) (stating inaccurately that "[a] petition for removal of
an action must be filed with a federal court within 30 days from the date service of the
summons and complaint is effected on the moving party").
5. 524 F. Supp. 1211 (W.D. Pa. 1981). Tyler is generally considered to be the lead-
ing case in support of a broad reading of § 1446(b). See Kerr v. Holland America-Line
Westours, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 207, 211 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Lindley v. DePriest, 755 F.
Supp. 1020, 1021 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Pic-Mount Corp. v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 708 F. Supp.
1113, 1115 (D. Nev. 1989); Conticommodity Servs. v. Perl, 663 F. Supp. 27, 30 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
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process.6 Part II is a critique of the so-called Love 7 line of cases,
which laudably but incorrectly holds that such removals are timely
under the "Proper Service Rule."' However, while this Article con-
6. See Tyler, 524 F. Supp. at 1213 ("All that is required is that the defendant re-
ceives, through service or otherwise, a copy of an 'initial pleading' from which the de-
fendant can ascertain that the case is one which is or has become removable."); Kerr, 794
F. Supp. at 213; Trepel v. Kohn, Milstein, Cohen, & Hausfeld, 789 F. Supp. 881, 882
(E.D. Mich. 1992); Teamster's Local 773 v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare
Fund, No. 91-5498, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16401, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 1991);
Brizendine v. Continental Casualty Co., 773 F. Supp. 313, 320 (N.D. Ala. 199 1);James
v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 91-0821, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11564, at *5-6 (E.D. La.
Aug. 13, 1991) (dicta); Pillin's Place, Inc. v. Bank One, Akron, N.A., 771 F. Supp. 205,
206-08 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Silverwood Estates Dev. Ltd. Partnership v. Adcock, 793 F.
Supp. 226, 228 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Lindley, 755 F. Supp. at 1021-26; Thompson v. Tele-
phone & Data Sys., No. 90-783-JU (D. Or.Jan. 7, 1991), aff'd without opinion, (D. Or. May
15, 1991); Dawson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 736 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (D. Colo.
1990); Schwartz Bros. v. Striped Horse Records, 745 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D. Md. 1990);
IMCO USA, Inc. v. Title Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 1322, 1323-24 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Uhles v.
F.W. Woolworth Co., 715 F. Supp. 297, 298 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Pic-Mount Corp., 708 F.
Supp. at 1115; Kear v. Sentry Ins. Co., No. 89-2884, 1989 WL 54035, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
May 18, 1989); York v. Horizon Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 712 F. Supp. 85, 89-90 (E.D. La.
1989); Harding v. Allied Prods. Corp., 703 F. Supp. 51, 52 (W.D. Tenn. 1989); Blair v.
City of Chicago, No. 87 C 2592, 1988 WL 6918, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1989); Neomed
Corp. v. Air-Shields Vickers, No. 88-8148, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 330, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 12, 1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 891 F.2d 63,
65-66 (3d Cir. 1989); North Jersey Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 125
F.R.D. 96, 99-100 (D.N.J. 1988); Beckley, Singleton, DeLanoy, Jemison & List,
Chartered v. Spademan, 694 F. Supp. 769, 771-72 (D. Nev. 1988); Green v. Johnson,
No. 88-4269, 1988 WL 83786, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1988); Pressman v. Days Inn of
Am., Civ. A. No. 88-7001, 1988 WL 123199, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1988); Kirby v.
OMI Corp., 655 F. Supp. 219, 222 (M.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd, 561 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1108 (1991); Scott v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 86 C
6639, 1987 WL 8982, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1987); Conticommodity, 663 F. Supp. at 30-
31; Dial-In, Inc. v. ARO Corp., 620 F. Supp. 27, 28-29 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Williams v.
Farmers Home Admin., 623 F. Supp. 1175, 1176 (E.D. Va. 1985); General Beverage
Sales Co. v. Zonin S.P.A., 589 F. Supp. 846, 848 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Maglio v. F.W. Wool-
worth Co., 542 F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Perimeter Lighting, Inc. v. Karlton, 456
F. Supp. 355, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1978); International Equity Corp. v. Pepper & Tanner, Inc.,
323 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Kulbeth v. Woolnought, 324 F. Supp. 908,910
(S.D. Tex. 1971); In re 73rd Precinct Station House, 329 F. Supp. 1175, 1177-78
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); Kurtz v. Harris, 245 F. Supp. 752, 754 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Benson v.
Bradley, 223 F. Supp. 669, 671 (D. Minn. 1963); Barr v. Hunter, 209 F. Supp. 476, 477
(W.D. Mo. 1962); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 192 F. Supp. 579, 580-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); McCargo v. Steele, 151 F. Supp. 435, 438 (W.D. Ark. 1957); Ray-
mond's, Inc. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 159 F. Supp. 212, 214-15 (D. Mass. 1956);
Mahoney v. Witt Ice & Gas Co., 131 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D. Mo. 1955); Richlin Advertis-
ing Corp. v. Century Florida Broadcasting Co., 122 F. Supp. 507, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
Potter v. Kahn, 108 F. Supp. 593, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
7. See Love v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
8. Id. at 67-68 (holding removal timely if defendants had not been "properly
served" more than 30 days before the removal petition); see also Estate of Baratt v. Phoe-
nix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 787 F. Supp. 333, 336-37 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Marion Corp. v.
Lloyds Bank, 738 F. Supp. 1377, 1379 (S.D. Ala. 1990); Valentine Sugars, Inc. v. Phillips
[VOL. 52:374
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cludes that the "Receipt Rule" is the correct interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b), it should not be taken as an endorsement of that
result. Part III urges Congress to resolve the case conflict9 by re-
moving this unnecessary pitfall for the unwary defendant, while re-
taining to the fullest possible degree a uniformfederal trigger for the
removal period.
I. CONGRESSIONAL CLARITY OF EXPRESSION
Since the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789,1" Congress has
assumed the power to provide for removal of civil and criminal ac-
tions from state to federal courts." This power derives from Article
III2 in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article
I'" and is, for all practical purposes, plenary.' 4 Pursuant to this es-
sentially unrestricted authority, Congress has provided for the re-
Petroleum Co., No. 89-2524, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16028, at *6 (E.D. La. Jan. 19,
1990); Hunter v. American Express Travel Related Servs., 643 F. Supp. 168, 170 (S.D.
Miss. 1986); Thomason v. Republic Ins. Co., 630 F. Supp. 331, 333-34 (E.D. Cal. 1986);
Skinner v. Old S. Life Ins. Co., 572 F. Supp. 811, 813 (W.D. La. 1983); Quick Erectors,
Inc. v. Seattle Bronze Corp., 524 F. Supp. 351, 353-54 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Gibbs v. Paley,
354 F. Supp. 270, 271-72 (D. P.R. 1973); Moore v. Firedoor Corp. of Am., 250 F. Supp.
683, 685 (D. Md. 1966); Potter v. McCauley, 186 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D. Md. 1960);
Rodriguez v. Hearty, 121 F. Supp. 125, 126-28 (S.D. Tex. 1954); Merz v. Dixon, 95 F.
Supp. 193, 197 (D. Kan. 1951); Alexander v. Peter Holding Co., 94 F. Supp. 299, 301
(E.D.N.Y. 1950). It appears that Potter, which had been considered a strong articulation
of the congressional intent on this issue, see 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3732, at 515 (1985), and Moore have been discarded by the
District of Maryland. See Schwartz Bros., 745 F. Supp. at 340 n.5 ("[T]he modern trend of
the cases and the preferable understanding of [sic] statute compels the Court to depart
from these two holdings.").
9. Appellate decisions on this issue are scarce because 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) gener-
ally prevents review of an order remanding a case to state court. See infra notes 122-123
and accompanying text.
10. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80 (providing for the removal
of actions from state courts when the amount in controversy was greater than $500 and
the defendant was an alien or a citizen of another state).
11. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 265 (1879) (noting that Congress's power
to remove civil cases "was exercised almost contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Constitution," and adding "it is impossible to see why the same power may not order
the remand of a criminal prosecution").
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ... [and to controversies]
between Citizens of different States ....").
13. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18 (vesting in Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof"); see Davis, 100 U.S. at 265-66 (tracing consti-
tutional derivation of power); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 349
(1816) ("This power of removal is not to be found in express terms in any part of the
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moval of state court proceedings whenever the federal court would
have had original jurisdiction, whether based on a federal question
or diversity of citizenship.' 5
In the process, Congress has imposed various restrictions on
the removal right. Only defendants, for instance, may remove the
action," and, if the action is founded on diversity jurisdiction, it
may not be removed if any of the properly aligned defendants is a
citizen of the forum state. 17 All defendants, moreover, must join in
the removal petition."8 Most notably, though, Congress has im-
posed a very short time period-thirty days-in which a defendant
may file a notice of removal.' 9 The problem explored by this Arti-
cle, simply stated, is: Thirty days from when?
To repeat, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) requires removal within thirty
days following "receipt by the defendant, through service or other-
wise, of a copy of the initial pleading .... " 2 0 This language seems
to negate formal service of process as the exclusive trigger for the
removal period. However, cases following Love v. State Farm Mutual
constitution; if it be given, it is only given by implication, as a power necessary and
proper to carry into effect some express power.").
14. See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833 (1966) ("We may assume
that Congress has constitutional power to provide that all federal issues be tried in the
federal courts, that all be tried in the courts of the States, or that jurisdiction of such
issues be shared. And in the exercise of that power, we may assume that Congress is
constitutionally fully free to establish the conditions under which civil or criminal pro-
ceedings involving federal issues may be removed from one court to another.").
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
16. Id. This provision proceeds from the logical assumption that plaintiffs are stuck
with the forum they originally chose.
17. Id. § 1441(b). Because removal jurisdiction is based in part on the premise that a
defendant may not get a fair hearing in a foreign state court, allowing a resident defend-
ant to remove a case filed by an out-of-state plaintiff makes no sense. See Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Aaron-Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1108, 1115 n.28 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(reiterating that "only out-of-staters may remove diversity cases" and explaining that
"[t]he only rationale for this distinction is the local prejudice argument that in-staters
need not fear their own courts, but out-of-staters have reason to seek a federal forum").
18. Id. § 1441(a). It is well settled that "all defendants in a state action must join in
the petition for removal, except for nominal, unknown or fraudulently joined parties."
Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.l (9th Cir. 1988). See also In re
Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 837 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (1 th Cir. 1988). Failure to join
proper defendants in the removal petition renders it procedurally defective. Emrich, 846
F.2d at 1193 n.1 (citing Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1981));
Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 (5th Cir. 1988). In-
deed, failure to explain why a codefendant has not consented to the removal may render
the petition defective. See P-Nut Carter's Fireworks v. Carey, 685 F. Supp. 952, 953 (D.
S.C. 1988).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
20. Id.
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Automobile Insurance Co. 2 1 contend, either expressly or implicitly, that
the statute is susceptible of another, more limited meaning based on
legislative purpose.2 2 Such contentions are founded in judicial sym-
pathy for chagrined defendants and their counsel, 23 not in a well-
reasoned and reasonable reading of the statute itself.
A. The Language of the Statute
A practitioner's analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) must begin and
end with two judicially imposed principles of statutory construction.
First, the plain-meaning rule states that when a court "find[s] the
terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete except
in rare and exceptional circumstances . . . where the application of
the statute as written will produce a result 'demonstrably at odds
with the intentions of its drafters.' "24 Corollary statements of this
rule are that a court must "assume that Congress said what it meant
and meant what it said," 25 that the statutory language "must ordina-
rily be regarded as conclusive,"' 26 and that the language of a statute
must be accorded "its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. "27
Second, removal statutes must be construed narrowly in favor
21. 542 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
22. See cases cited supra note 8. As one court explained, "The Love line of cases tends
to look to the legislative history behind the statute and conclude that Congress meant to
solve problems which had arisen in certain states under the former statute, and not to
shorten the removal period." Marion Corp. v. Lloyds Bank, 738 F. Supp. 1377, 1378
(S.D. Ala. 1990).
23. Witness, for example, Bennett v. Allstate Insurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 299 (N.D.
Cal. 1990), wherein Judge Conti chastised Receipt Rule cases for failing to "weigh[] the
practical consequences of their decision." Id. at 303. In response, it must be noted that
the "practical consequences" of a plain reading of a relatively clear statute are by and
large irrelevant, except to the extent that the most logical reading may lead to absurd
results. See infra text accompanying notes 24-27. As set forth in the text below, the
"practical consequences" of the Receipt Rule may be surprising, but they clearly are not
absurd.
24. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S. Ct. 599, 604 (1991) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)); see also Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430
(1981); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978).
25. Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir.
1978).
26. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980);
see also Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985) ("In construing a federal
statute it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Con-
gress employed 'accurately expresses the legislative purpose.' " (quoting Park 'N Fly Inc.
v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985))).
27. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 602 F.2d 444, 450 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979).
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of remand.2' As the Supreme Court explained in Shamrock Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Sheets:29
Not only does the language of the Act of 1887 evidence the
Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the
federal courts on removal, but the policy of the successive
acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal
courts is one calling for the strict construction of such leg-
islation. . . . "Due regard for the rightful independence of
state governments, which should actuate federal courts, re-
quires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction
to the precise limits which the statute has defined."
30
Thus, even if 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) were ambiguous, that ambiguity
should be construed in favor of remand and against the untimely
defendant.
The cases rejecting a requirement of formal service 3 1 generally
rely upon a "presumption-in-favor-of-remand" or "plain-meaning"
rationale. For example, in Tyler v. Prudential Life Insurance Co. of
America, 2 the defendant received a copy of the complaint on March
4, accepted formal service on April 10, and filed for removal on May
4, more than thirty days after receipt but less than thirty days after
service3 3 In concluding that removal was untimely, the Tyler court
noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) "is to be strictly construed against
removal and in favor of remand '3 4 and held that "[s]ervice of pro-
cess under state law does not control for removal purposes."3 5
Although Tyler is generally cited as the leading case on this
question,36 the decision itself is rather sparse and conclusory. A
more extensive analysis of the statute appears in Pic-Mount Corp. v.
Stoffel Seals Corp. 7 Again, that case involved the lapse of more than
thirty days between the receipt of a courtesy copy of the complaint
28. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); Libhart v.
Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979).
29. 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
30. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
31. See supra note 6.
32. 524 F. Supp. 1211 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
33. Id. at 1212-13.
34. Id. at 1213 (citing Crompton v. Park Ward Motors, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 699, 702
n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1979)).
35. Id. (citing Perimeter Lighting, Inc. v. Karlton, 456 F. Supp. 355, 359 (N.D. Ga.
1978)).
36. See, e.g., Lindley v. DePriest, 755 F. Supp. 1020, 1021 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Pic-Mount
Corp. v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (D. Nev. 1989); Conticommodity
Servs. v. Perl, 663 F. Supp. 27, 30 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
37. 708 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Nev. 1989).
380 [VOL. 52:374
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and the filing of a petition for removal. After surveying the case law
on the timeliness issue, the Pic-Mount court concluded, inter alia, that
(1) the statute clearly and unambiguously did not require formal ser-
vice to trigger the removal period,3s and (2) any ambiguity should
be resolved in favor of the Tyler approach under "the well estab-
lished rule that removal statutes are to be construed strictly against
removal." 9
Most recently, the Northern District of Ohio rendered a Receipt
Rule opinion teeming with judicially conservative canons of statu-
tory interpretation.40 In Pillin's Place, Inc. v. Bank One, Akron, N.A. ,4
the plaintiffs sent by facsimile transmission to one of the defendants
"a '[c]ourtesy copy of the [c]omplaint' filed by the [p]laintiffs that
day."14 2 The defendants were served nine days later. They removed
twenty-five days after that, thus creating a 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is-
sue.4' The court held removal to be untimely, reasoning as follows:
It has long been settled that as a general principle the re-
moval statutes are to be construed strictly out of "[d]ue re-
gard for the rightful independence of state governments
...." Further, "[t]he party seeking removal bears the bur-
den of establishing its right thereto."
"The [§ 1446] requirement for timely filing is not jurisdic-
tional, but it is mandatory and must be strictly applied."
As the Supreme Court of the United States has frequently
noted, "[i]nterpretation of a statute must begin with the
statute's language." "The plain meaning of legislation
should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which]
the literal application of a statute will produce a result de-
monstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.'"
The arguments supporting adoption of the Receipt
Rule are highly compelling and ultimately persuasive.
First, the Receipt Rule arises from a straightforward inter-
pretation of the clear statutory language. Second, the leg-
islative history does not lead to the conclusion that the
Receipt Rule is "demonstrably at odds" with Congress' in-
38. Id. at 1116.
39. Id. at 1118.
40. See Pillin's Place, Inc. v. Bank One, Akron, N.A., 771 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ohio
1991).
41. 771 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
42. Id. at 206.
43. Id.
1993]
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tent in amending § 1446(b). And third, the Receipt Rule is
most in keeping with the strict interpretation of the re-
moval statute required by Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit
precedent.44
This mantric recitation of stock phrases adds little to the growth of
legal reasoning, but it does underscore the increasing importance of
such canons in resolving this issue.
Intellectually troublesome as these shorthand rules of construc-
tion may be,45 the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is relatively plain
44. Id. at 206-07 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
45. As legal realists and critical legal students have reminded us, there is never a
"plain meaning" in any piece of writing. See Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incom-
mensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1468 (1990) (commenting that
current members of the Supreme Court "are not very likely to hear, let alone be per-
suaded by, an argument from within the indeterminacy critique-whether the
unknowability of the framers' intent, the polysemous character of language, or the con-
textuality of all meaning"); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 452 (1989) ("[Legal] realists argued that the canons [of statutory
construction] substituted unhelpful, misleading, and mechanical rules for a more prag-
matic and functional inquiry into statutory purposes and structure .... Almost no one
has had a favorable word to say about the canons in many years."); Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 867-69 (1930) (criticizing the logical underpinnings
of the plain meaning rule).
It is also troubling that, despite the Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets emphasis on
congressional concerns regarding federal court jurisdiction, see 313 U.S. 100, 108-09
(1941), the "strict construction" principle is frequently applied to procedural defects in
the notice of removal, including untimeliness. See Shadley v. Miller, 733 F. Supp. 54, 55
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (strictly construing the rule that all defendants must join in removal
petition); Hom v. Service Merchandise Co., 727 F. Supp. 1343, 1344-45 (N.D. Cal.
1990); Rezendes v. Dow Corning Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (E.D. Cal. 1989)
(strictly construing the maximum one-year limit on removal under § 1446(b)). A mo-
ment's reflection reveals that Shamrock Oil does not necessarily support a narrow inter-
pretation of the procedural provisions in the removal statutes. There is clearly more
reason to construe strictly removal jurisdiction than to construe strictly the 30-day re-
moval period, which is really more akin to the time period in which to file a responsive
pleading than to a statute of limitations. It is difficult to imagine that the drafters of the
removal statutes would be disturbed over an untimely but otherwise nonprejudicial and
appropriate removal, whereas they could well be outraged if a federal court improperly
divested a state court of its jurisdiction.
The stronger justification for strictly construing procedural removal provisions
rests not on jurisdiction, but on more practical concerns of fairness and judicial expedi-
ency. Assume, for example, that the district court denies a motion to remand, that the
case goes to trial, that the defendant prevails, and that, on appeal, the plaintiff-appellant
argues, inter alia, that the removal was untimely. A reversal and eventual remand on this
issue would be immensely unfair to the defendant, who won fair and square on the mer-
its in a court of competent jurisdiction, and, ironically, to the plaintiff as well, whose
potentially valid substantive points of error would not be reviewed by the federal appel-
late court. More importantly, our national judicial system would be forced to suffer the
burden of redundant trials. Under these circumstances, and considering the decreasing
prejudicial differences between state and federal courts, it may be appropriate to weight
the inquiry in favor of remand. Cf. Collins v. American Red Cross, 724 F. Supp. 353,
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in the sense that one may conclude, with a reasonably high degree
of confidence, that Congress intended-or at least thoughtlessly
commanded 4 6-the removal period to commence once the defend-
ant received a copy of the initial pleading, whether throughformal
service of process or not. Focusing specifically on the "through ser-
vice or otherwise" language, the only defensible reading is that
Congress said that the removal period must commence upon the
defendant's receipt, through service or not through service, of a copy of
the initial pleading.47
B. Ambiguity
One court, however, has expressly claimed that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) is ambiguous.48 In Marion Corp. v. Lloyds Bank,49 Chief
Judge Howard, after mechanically reciting the strictures against de-
parting from the plain meaning and against liberal construction of
the removal statutes, nevertheless concluded: "Here, however, the
words 'or otherwise' are so vague as to have no meaning. Receipt of
a complaint through service 'or otherwise' taken to its literal conclu-
358 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (noting that the possibility of reversal on appeal and remand to state
court underscored the prudence of resolving doubts in favor of remand).
46. "[Wlhile legislative history is helpful, this court finds that the law which must be
applied is found in what Congress actually said, not in speculation about what it meant to
say." Lindley v. DePriest, 755 F. Supp. 1020, 1025 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (emphasis added). It
is, of course, quite possible that Congress never thought about courtesy copies or defec-
tive service when it drafted the statute.
47. Indeed, numerous courts have concluded that the language of § 1446(b) clearly
and unambiguously does not require formal service to commence the removal period.
See Silverwood Estates Dev. Ltd. Partnership v. Adcock, 793 F. Supp. 226, 228 (N.D. Cal.
1991) ("This court, however, remains convinced that 'receipt by defendant, through ser-
vice or otherwise' means 'receipt by defendant, through service or otherwise.' "); Pic-
Mount Corp. v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 (D. Nev. 1989) (describing
the language of § 1446(b) as "straightforward" and "unambiguous"); General Beverage
Sales Co. v. Zonin S.P.A., 589 F. Supp. 846, 848 (W.D. Wis. 1984) ("The statute specifi-
cally reads 'receipt by the defendant,' and the statute clearly does not require service.");
Maglio v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 542 F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("The language of
§ 1446(b) is very clear and unambiguous."); Potter v. Kahn, 108 F. Supp. 593, 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (noting the "clear language" of the "or otherwise" clause).
48. See Marion Corp. v. Lloyds Bank, 738 F. Supp. 1377, 1379 (S.D. Ala. 1990).
Other cases have referred to § 1446(b) as being less than clear, but none has empha-
sized this finding. For instance, the Southern District of Florida adopted the Receipt
Rule after noting that Congress had convened over 40 times since another court had
commented on the section's "lack of clarity." Lindley v. DePriest, 755 F. Supp. 1020,
1025 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (citing Raymond's, Inc. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 159 F.
Supp. 212, 215 (D. Mass. 1956)) ("[Tlhe language chosen while not altogether happy is
at least consistent with the Congressional purpose."). See also Hunter v. American Ex-
press Travel Related Servs., 643 F. Supp. 168, 169 (S.D. Miss. 1986) ("The difference in
interpretation stems from the ambiguous 'or otherwise' portion of the statute.").
49. 738 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Ala. 1990).
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sion could mean that any receipt of a complaint is sufficient to start
the removal time period running. "50 From this premise, Judge
Howard concluded that resort to legislative history was appropriate
and that, based on his reading of the congressional purpose, formal
service of process under state law was required to commence the
removal period.5' This finding of ambiguity, though perhaps intui-
tively praiseworthy as an attempt to circumvent a harsh statute, is
incorrect for several reasons.
As a preliminary observation, the "literal conclusion" of "or
otherwise" is not as broad as the Marion court implies. The time
period would not begin to run, for example, if the defendant re-
ceived a copy of a complaint that had not yet been filed.5 2 Likewise,
the receipt of an inexact version of the filed complaint would not
trigger the time period because such a document would not consti-
tute a "copy. '" 53 Finally, if the copy of the complaint, combined with
50. Id. at 1379.
51. Id. As discussed below, I contend that the available legislative history does not
support a requirement of service. See infra notes 103-120 and accompanying text.
52. This assertion may be proved in three related ways. First, § 1446(b) requires
that the defendant receive a copy of an "initial pleading." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). By any
fair construction, a document purporting to be a complaint, which has not been filed, is
not an "initial pleading" because nothing has been "initially pled." See, e.g., Kerr v.
Holland America-Line Westours, 794 F. Supp. 207, 213 n.5 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (stating
the court's factual assumption "that the copy of the 'initial pleading' provided to the
defendant has previously been properly filed in the state court"). Second, § 1446(b)
further requires that the "copy" set "forth the claim for relief upon which such action or
proceeding is based." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). An unfiled complaint "is certainly not one
from which [the defendant] could intelligently ascertain removability since it [is] subject
to later amendment or complete change." James v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., No. 91-
0821, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11564, at *6-7 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 1991) (adopting Receipt
Rule but holding that "[a] defendant's right to removal should not be governed by a
letter containing a pleading which has not, and may not be filed by the plaintiff"); see also
Kerr, 794 F. Supp. at 213; Campbell v. Associated Press, 223 F. Supp. 151, 153 (E.D. Pa.
1963) (holding that draft complaint, subsequently altered before filing, could not consti-
tute an initial pleading). Third, the enabling language of the statute provides in perti-
nent part:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have origi-
nal jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added). It is inconceivable that an unfiled complaint,
which is really no more than a draft, could commence the removal period when no ac-
tion has been "brought in a State court" and, consequently, no "action is pending."
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); see also Campbell, 223 F. Supp. at 153 (holding that a draft
complaint that was ultimately filed in amended form was "not a 'copy of the initial plead-
ing' as required by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b)"). It is probably not necessary, however, that
the copy be time-stamped. See North Jersey Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
125 F.R.D. 96, 100 (D. N.J. 1988).
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other facts known to the defendant, did not reveal the existence of
federal subject matter jurisdiction, the time period would not com-
mence.54 Accordingly, the conclusion that "or otherwise" means
what the dictionary says it means 55 would not lead to the outrageous
or absurd results that Judge Howard feared, because the statutory
language surrounding it provides necessary clarifications and quali-
fications. In other words, aside from the potential for surprise in
the exercise of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), there is no substantive unfair-
ness in requiring removal within thirty days from receipt of a docu-
ment from which removability could be ascertained, whether or not
such "receipt" was attended by state law formalities.56
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) ("If the case stated by the initial pleading is not remova-
ble, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other
paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable .... "). As the Tyler court explained:
An initial pleading must include a statement of the case which will allow the
defendant to examine the basis for the action. To qualify as an initial pleading
for removal purposes, the document received by the defendant must contain
such notice of the state proceeding that the defendant can ascertain the remov-
ability of the action or proceeding.
Tyler v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 524 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (citation
omitted). For the proposition that the complaint and other facts known to the defendant
are sufficient, see Thompson v. Telephone & Data Systems, No. 90-783-JU (D. Or. Jan.
7, 1991), aff'd without opinion, (D. Or. May 15, 1991) (noting that though the complaint
allegedly misaligned parties to conceal diversity jurisdiction, defendants knew of the al-
leged misalignment when they received the complaint); Richman v. Zimmerman, Inc.,
644 F. Supp. 540, 542 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (noting that while complaint did not allege the
amount in controversy, defendant had sufficient "clues" of removability).
55. See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 958 (1991) (defining
"otherwise" as "under other circumstances," "in another manner; differently," and "in
other respects").
56. This is not to say that the phrase "or otherwise" cannot be ambiguous or suscep-
tible, under proper circumstances, to a limiting construction. Indeed, Judge Howard
could have cited Nicholson Construction Co. v. Standard Fire Insurance Co., 760 F.2d
74 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the words "or otherwise" were held to be ambiguous in the
context of a construction payment bond. Id. at 77 (" '[T]he word "otherwise" . . . is
always a relative word ......."(quoting Philadelphia ex rel. Geshwind v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co., 46 Pa. Super. 313, 318 (1911))). Nevertheless, courts specifically addressing the
phrase in other contexts have almost always concluded that "or otherwise" is intention-
ally broad, not ambiguous. See United States v. McCabe, 812 F.2d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir.
1987) (" '[A]n expansive interpretation [of "or otherwise" as used in the federal kidnap-
ping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988)] has been uniformly adhered to by the federal
courts .... .. (quoting United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1070-71, (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983))); United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 576
(C.C.P.A. 1975) ("The phrase ['or otherwise' as used in the Trading with the Enemy Act,
50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1988)] appears to us to be expansive, not restrictive."); Dunham v.
Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 106 F.2d 1, 3 (C.C.P.A. 1939) ("The words 'or otherwise' [as
used in disputed municipal bonds] ... can only enlarge the reference .... ). It should
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More importantly, the courts addressing the implications of this
statutory language have failed to see that a broad reading of 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b) does not depend on the phrase "through service or
otherwise." Plucking the offending clause from the statute merely
leaves "receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of the initial plead-
ing." So edited, this language certainly does not advance the argu-
ment that service is required to begin the removal period. In fact,
having chosen the broad word "receipt" rather than the available
phrase "formal service upon,"57 Congress appears to have used the
phrase "through service or otherwise" to make explicit what is al-
ready implied by the rest of the statement: service under state law is
not required to trigger the removal period.
Thus, to support his assertion that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is
vague, Judge Howard should have concluded not only that "or
otherwise" is unclear, but that "receipt ... of a copy" could reason-
ably be restricted to mean only "proper service of a copy." This he
cannot do. As the earliest court to address this issue aptly noted,
the proposition that formal service is required to trigger the re-
moval period "can be sustained only by reading into the statute a
provision which is not only not there but which Congress seems de-
liberately to have omitted."58
II. THE LOVE LINE OF CASES
4. The Reasoning of the Love Decision
Judge Howard is not alone in his distaste for the "plain mean-
ing" of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Indeed, the Marion decision, though
perhaps representing the most vehement rejection of "or other-
wise" as a meaningful term, merely followed the reasoning set forth
earlier in Love v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.59 The
so-called "Love line" or "Proper Service Rule" constitutes a strong
and enduring minority position on the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b).6 °
also be noted in this regard that Congress has not changed the wording of § 1446(b)
despite a continuing significant conflict in the case authority.
57. As discussed in the text below, an earlier version of this statute expressly tied the
removal period to formal service under state law. See infra notes 69-70 and accompany-
ing text.
58. Potter v. Kahn, 108 F. Supp. 593, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), quoted in Pic-Mount Corp.
v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (D. Nev. 1989) and in Kulbeth v. Wool-
nought, 324 F. Supp. 908, 910 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
59. 542 F. Supp. 65, 67-68 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
60. See cases cited supra note 8.
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In Love, the plaintiffs sent a courtesy copy of a complaint to op-
posing counsel on the same day it was filed. 6 Fifty-six days later,
the defendants filed a petition for removal.62 The plaintiffs had not
properly served the defendants as of thirty days before removal.63
The issue, then, was whether receipt of the courtesy copy com-
menced the removal period. While noting that, "on the surface,
there is much to recommend" the argument that a courtesy copy is
sufficient,64 the Northern District of Georgia held that "the removal
period . . . cannot commence until a plaintiff properly serves de-
fendant with process."6 5
The Love court justified its decision on three grounds. First,
finding truth in numbers, it stated that "most district courts" had
held that formal service of process was required to trigger the re-
moval period.66 Second, the court suggested that any other holding
would "permit[] a plaintiff to circumvent the already existing re-
quirement of personal service through informal service."67 Finally,
and most importantly, it held that triggering removal upon informal
"receipt" would contravene the legislative intent.68 The Love deci-
sion provides an extensive view of the history of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b), revealing as follows:
Prior to 1948, a removal petition was in essence a state
court responsive pleading; it was filed in that court within
the time permitted to answer a complaint as established by
the state's rules of civil practice. In 1948, in an attempt to
make the removal period more uniform, Congress revised
section 1446(b) to provide that the removal petition be
filed in federal court "within twenty days6 9 after com-
mencement of the action or service of process, whichever is
later." 62 Stat. 939 (1948). Under this formulation, of
course, the removal period could not begin until service of
process had been obtained. A problem arose, however, in
61. Love, 542 F. Supp. at 66.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 67.
65. Id. at 68.
66. Id. at 67. But see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
67. Love, 542 F. Supp. at 68. For a similar contention, see Rodriguez v. Hearty, 121
F. Supp. 125, 128 (S.D. Tex. 1954) (noting that a strict reading of the statute would
present out-of-state plaintiffs with a choice "between removing and waiving their right
to proper service or waiting for service and waiving their right to remove").
68. Love, 542 F. Supp. at 67-68.
69. The removal period was set at 20 days in the 1948 Act and expanded to 30 days
in a 1965 amendment. Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-215, 79 Stat. 887. (Editor's
note.)
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those states such as New York which permitted a plaintiff to
commence a suit without serving or filing a complaint,
merely by serving the defendant with a summons. Under
the 1948 version of section 1446(b), in such cases the re-
moval period could expire before a defendant received a
copy of the complaint, thus depriving him of an opportu-
nity to remove the action. It was in response to this prob-
lem that Congress revised section 1446(b) to permit
removal "within twenty [now thirty] days after the receipt
by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy
of the initial pleading." See H.R. Rep. No. 352, 81st Cong.
1st Sess., reprinted in [1949] U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1254,
1268. Thus, the "through service or otherwise" language
was intended to expand the removal period in states fol-
lowing the New York Rule.7°
Consequently, the Love court (1) determined that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) was worded to correct an anomaly in the 1948 revision,
(2) derived from this narrow goal a broader purpose to enlarge the
removal period, and (3) concluded that a plain-meaning reading of
the statute would contravene that broader purpose.7 '
Love's legislative history argument is addressed more fully be-
low. 72 It should be noted here, however, that the court's otherjusti-
fications-its reference to the weight of authority and its fear that
service-of-process rules might be circumvented-are simply incor-
rect. Contrary to the Love court's statement, the majority of cases,
even in 1982, favored a strict construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).73
70. Love, 542 F. Supp. at 67-68 (bracketed alterations in original).
71. See id.
72. See infra notes 103-120 and accompanying text.
73. Compare Maglio v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 542 F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(holding that "[t]he language of § 1446(b) is very clean and unambiguous"); Tyler v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 524 F. Supp. 1211 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Perimeter Lighting, Inc.
v. Karlton, 456 F. Supp. 355, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1978); International Equity Corp. v. Pepper
& Tanner, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Kulbeth v. Woolnought, 324 F.
Supp. 908, 910 (S.D. Tex. 1971); In re 73rd Precinct Station House, 329 F. Supp. 1175,
1177-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Kurtz v. Harris, 245 F. Supp. 752, 754 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Ben-
son v. Bradley, 223 F. Supp. 669, 671 (D. Minn. 1963); Barr v. Hunter, 209 F. Supp. 476,
477 (W.D. Mo. 1962); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 192 F. Supp. 579, 580
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); McCargo v. Steele, 151 F. Supp. 435, 438 (W.D. Ark. 1957); Ray-
mond's, Inc. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 159 F. Supp. 212, 214-15 (D. Mass. 1956);
Mahoney v. Witt Ice & Gas Co., 131 F. Supp. 564, 568 (W.D. Mo. 1955); Richlin Adver-
tising Corp. v. Century Florida Broadcasting Co., 122 F. Supp. 507, 509 (S.D.N.Y.
1954); Potter v. Kahn, 108 F. Supp. 593, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) with Quick Erectors, Inc. v.
Seattle Bronze Corp., 524 F. Supp. 351, 353-54 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (finding, for § 1446(b)
purposes, that "a copy of the pleading [received] before it was duly served is irrele-
vant"); Gibbs v. Paley, 354 F. Supp. 270, 271-72 (D. P.R. 1973); Moore v. Firedoor
Corp. of Am., 250 F. Supp. 683, 685 (D. Md. 1966); Potter v. McCauley, 186 F. Supp.
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Moreover, as several courts have pointed out, strict construction
would not, as Love suggests, permit a plaintiff to "circumvent" for-
mal service requirements, because any defect could be challenged in
the federal court as easily as in the state forum. 74 Accordingly, the
Love court's decision to require formal service stands or falls on the
legislative history rationale. With the exception of Marion Corp. v.
Lloyds Bank,75 cases following the Love decision have not significantly
added to its reasoning.7 6
B. Review by the Appellate Courts
Only two federal circuit courts of appeals have addressed this
issue. But these courts have not considered the problem carefully
enough to resolve the question. In Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco
Industrial Gases, Inc.,77 the plaintiff sued defendants Airco and the
146, 149 (D. Md. 1960); Rodriguez v. Hearty, 121 F. Supp. 125, 126-28 (S.D. Tex.
1954); Merz v. Dixon, 95 F. Supp. 193, 197 (D. Kan. 1951); Alexander v. Peter Holding
Co., 94 F. Supp. 299, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 1950). According to this extensive research, 15
reported cases favored strict construction while only 7 found a looser interpretation.
Statements in subsequent cases that Love is in the majority derive directly from the Love
court's mistaken research.
74. See IMCO USA, Inc. v. Title Ins. Co., 729 F. Supp. 1322, 1323 (M.D. Fla. 1990)
("The Defendant could have attacked Plaintiff's attempt to perfect service in this Court
from the onset."); Pic-Mount Corp. v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1113, 1117 (D.
Nev. 1989) ("The fact that removal requirements are not identical to state service re-
quirements in no way allows a plaintiff to engage in 'chicanery' by subverting service
requirements or the right to remove."); Conticommodity Servs. v. Perl, 663 F. Supp. 27,
29 (N.D. Il1. 1987) ("Whether a defendant removes to federal court or not, perfect ser-
vice is necessary if the plaintiff is to maintain his action."); see also IA MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, 0.168[3.-5-3], at 581 n.4 (1986) ("[Vlalidity of service of process may be
challenged after removal."). The Conticommodity court added:
should a defendant wish to stand upon his right to . . . stricter state process
rules, he may remain in the state forum and present a motion to quash there. It
is difficult to see how this choice between state and federal service rules-which
mirror the procedural choices at stake in any decision to remove-tends to un-
dercut the removal right.
Conticommodity, 663 F. Supp. at 29.
75. 738 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Ala. 1990); see discussion supra notes 48-59 and accom-
panying text.
76. In Estate of Baratt v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 787 F. Supp. 333
(W.D.N.Y. 1992), Judge Telesca did say: "Finally, and perhaps most importantly, [the
Tyler line] would not provide the clearest rule. Collateral litigation would surely result
from arguments over whether the defendant 'actually or constructively [1' received pa-
pers which were improperly served." Id. at 337. This contention is easily dealt with.
The Love line of cases, far from creating "the clearest rule," muddies the water in two
ways. First, it judicially rewrites the relatively clear language of the statute. Second, it
embroils the district court in a usually unnecessary dispute over state service require-
ments. Any objective observer must conclude that it is easier to determine simple re-
ceipt than sufficiency of service under the diverse laws of the fifty states.
77. 676 F.2d 270 (7th Cir. 1982).
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American Arbitration Association (AAA) in state court after Airco
filed a demand for arbitration of a contract dispute. 78 Airco re-
ceived a copy of the state court complaint on January 19, 1981, the
day the action was commenced. Airco was served with a copy of the
state court summons on January 23.
Airco filed a verified removal petition in federal district court
on January 26, well within the thirty-day time limit imposed by 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b) under either the Receipt Rule or the Proper Ser-
vice Rule. However, on February 3, Northern Illinois Gas moved to
remand the cause to state court, arguing, inter alia, that the removal
petition was defective because Airco had failed to join the AAA in
the petition, or explain its absence.8" Airco filed an amended peti-
tion for removal on February 20, stating that AAA need not have
been joined since it was a nominal party.8" The plaintiff argued that
the amended petition was untimely.
The court allowed the late amendment to cure the defective pe-
tition because "the state court record, attached to the removal peti-
tion, contained the necessary factual information regarding the
AAA's nominal party status. '8 2 However, the court stated as a pre-
liminary matter that "[r]emoval must be effected within thirty days
after a defendant receives a copy of the state court complaint, or is
served, whichever occurs first."8 3 And while the court engaged in
no analysis of the Tyler-Love dichotomy, it did reject defendant
Airco's Love argument, stating in a footnote that "Airco's counsel's
receipt of the complaint on January 19, 1981 constituted effective
receipt . . . for purposes of the time limitation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) .... 4
Perhaps because of the absence of serious direct analysis of the
issue by the Seventh Circuit, district courts in that circuit have not
treated its pronouncement on the timeliness issue as dispositive.85
Rather, at least one court has cited Northern Illinois Gas to point out
the scarcity of appellate decisions on the issue.86
78. Id. at 271.
79. Id. at 272.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 274.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 273 n.l.
85. See, e.g., Conticommodity Servs. v. Perl, 663 F. Supp. 27, 30 (N.D. Ill. 1987);
General Beverage Sales Co. v. Zonin, S.P.A., 589 F. Supp. 846, 848 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
86. See Kerr v. Holland America-Line Westours, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 207, 210 n.3 (E.D.
Mich. 1992). For an explanation of the limited opportunity for appellate review in this
context, see infra text accompanying notes 122-123.
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The other circuit court of appeal treating the issue also did so
obliquely. In Pochiro v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 7 the plain-
tiffs sued in Arizona state court, delivering a copy of the complaint
to outside counsel for the defendant on November 30, 1984.8 Pru-
dential was formally served on December 6, 1984.89 Thereafter, on
January 3, 1985, thirty-four days after the claimed receipt by outside
counsel, but twenty-nine days after formal service, Prudential filed
its petition for removal. The district court denied the Pochiros' mo-
tion to remand.9" On appeal, the Pochiros argued that Prudential's
removal petition was untimely because it was filed more than thirty
days after a copy of the complaint was delivered to Prudential's
outside counsel. 9' The Ninth Circuit rejected this assertion, hold-
ing as follows:
This argument . . . fails, however, because the Pochiros
make no claim that the law firm representing Prudential in
a prior action between the same parties was authorized to
accept service of process for Prudential in the Pochiro ac-
tion. Moreover, the Pochiros do not claim that Prudential otherwise
received a copy of their complaint before December 2, 1984, 92 which
was the thirtieth day prior to the filing of the petition for removal.
Thus, the removal petition was timely.93
Although the Pochiro court did not confront the 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
issue directly, it may be argued that its reliance on the "or otherwise
received" language rejected the reasoning set forth in Love.94
This implicit rejection of Love reveals itself in two ways. First,
as noted, the Love court held that the "or otherwise" language of 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b) is applicable only in those states that have adopted
the New York procedure permitting service of the summons without
the complaint, and that formal service is required in all other
87. 827 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1987).
88. See Responsive Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion To Remand at
1, Pochiro, No. Civ. 85-11 PHX EHC (D. Ariz. filed Feb. 4, 1985) [hereinafter "Prudential
Responsive Memorandum"]. The Ninth Circuit Pochiro decision does not specify certain
dates, making it awkward to cite as precedent.
89. Id.
90. See Pochiro, 827 F.2d at 1248.
91. Id.
92. Actually, December 4 was the thirtieth day prior to removal. Although this error
does not affect analysis of the case, it further weakens Pochiro as persuasive precedent.
93. Pochiro, 827 F.2d at 1248-49 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
94. See Love v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 65, 67-68 (N.D. Ga.
1982).
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states.95 Arizona is not, however, one of those states that adopted
the New York procedure.9 6
Second, Pochiro held that receipt prior to December 2, 1984,
would have rendered removal untimely. This holding rejects the
Love position that only formal service can trigger the thirty-day pe-
riod, because December 2 was also prior to formal service of process on
the defendant. 7 Therefore, by citing the "or otherwise" language of
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) with respect to an Arizona state court action
and by identifying dates prior to formal service as appropriate trig-
gers of the thirty-day period, Pochiro necessarily rejected Love. This
argument assumes, however, that the court actually considered the
matter.
The complexity and confusion of the Pochiro decision render it
vulnerable to the charge that its departure from the Love view was an
inadvertent dictum. Nevertheless, when analyzed closely, the deci-
sion provides credible appellate support for the Tyler approach.
The only case citing Pochiro in the context of the courtesy copy
issue is a magistrate's decision in Thompson v. Telephone & Data Sys-
tents. 98 In that case, the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action
on May 21, 1990.99 On May 29, the plaintiff's counsel sent one de-
fendant's counsel a courtesy copy of the complaint, which was im-
mediately forwarded to the client.'"I Formal service occurred on
July 13, and one defendant removed on August 3. "' In holding
that receipt, not formal service, triggered the removal period, the
magistrate relied in part on Pochiro, but distinguished the facts in the
Thompson dispute:
In [Pochiro], plaintiffs delivered a copy of their complaint to
defendant's counsel of record more than thirty days before
defendant petitioned for removal. Plaintiffs did not claim,
however, that defendant's counsel of record was authorized
to accept service of process for defendant. "Moreover,
95. Id.; see also Thomason v. Republic Ins. Co., 630 F. Supp. 331, 333-34 (E.D. Cal.
1986) ("The 'or otherwise' language pertains only to those states where plaintiff can
commence a suit without filing or serving initial pleadings until sometime later.").
96. Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure provide that the "summons and complaint
shall be served together." See ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1987).
97. See Prudential Responsive Memorandum, supra note 87, at 1.
98. No. 90-783-JU (D. Or.Jan. 7, 1991) (perJuba, Mag.), aff'd without opinion, (D. Or.
May 15, 1991) (per Panner, J.). As noted supra note *, the author successfully argued
that removal in that case was untimely.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 4. The removing defendant argued that the remaining defendant was im-
properly aligned, thus obviating the requirement that all defendants join in the removal.
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[plaintiffs] do not claim that [defendant itself] otherwise re-
ceived a copy of their complaint before ... the thirtieth day
prior to the filing of the petition for removal."
Contrary to Pochiro, the petitioning defendants here have
stipulated that their outside counsel forwarded copies of
plaintiff's complaint to defendants and that these were
seen by an officer, director, or managing agent of theirs
about sixty days before the petition for removal.' °2
As set forth above, the magistrate's opinion is a legitimate reading
of Pochiro, though, for purposes of interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b),
it would have been preferable if the Ninth Circuit had spoken more
clearly.
C. The Legislative Intent
When all is said and done, the Tyler cases rely blindly on rules of
construction while the Love cases rely blindly on the suspect reason-
ing in Love and vague policy-based rationales. To determine the
"correct" reading of the statute, then, we must look closely at the
legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and at the Love argument
derived from it.
Courts have found at least four legislative purposes underlying
the 1949 amendments to the statute. Based on considerations of
fairness, the amendment was intended to ensure that, in New York-
type jurisdictions, the defendant had the full twenty,'" 3 and later
thirty, days from receipt of a copy of the initial pleading.10 4
Although this is clearly one of the purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b),' 0 5 it should be agreed that, "if Congress had intended to
require service, in all circumstances, or limit the 'or otherwise' lan-
102. Id. at 7 (citations omitted) (bracketed insertions within quotation marks in
original).
103. See supra note 69.
104. See Love v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 65, 68 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
105. In some States suits are begun by the service of a summons or other pro-
cess without the necessity of filing any pleading until later. As the section now
stands, this places the defendant in the position of having to take steps to re-
move a suit to Federal court before he knows what the suit is about. As said
section is herein proposed to be rewritten, a defendant is not required to file
his petition for removal until 20 days after he has received (or it has been made
available to him) a copy of the initial pleading filed by the plaintiff setting forth
the claim upon which the suit is based and the relief prayed for.
S. REP. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248, 1254; see also
H.R. REP. No. 352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248, 1268("Subsection (b) of section 1446 of title 28, U.S.C., as revised, has been found to create
difficulty in those States, such as New York, where suit is commenced by the service of a
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guage to application in certain states, it surely could have written
the statute explicitly to achieve that result."' °6 To limit the congres-
sional purpose solely to the New York problem is inconsistent with
the broad language Congress employed.
Surprisingly, the Love court noted another purpose: to ensure
that, in states allowing substituted service on a state officer-for ex-
ample, in connection with nonresident motorist statutes-the time
period commenced only upon the defendant's actual receipt of a
copy of the initial pleading, not upon receipt by the state officer.10 7
Although I agree with this interpretation as well, it is important to
note that this congressional "purpose" does not appear in the legis-
lative reports. It is a judicial construction. Inexplicably, the Love
court did not reconcile its purported narrow reliance on express
legislative statements with its speculation on the possibility of other
intentions of the drafters.
Love and its progeny derive from these two limited goals a
larger third purpose, to "expand the removal period."'0 8 There-
fore, they conclude, adherence to the express language of the stat-
ute-which quite literally limits the defendant to thirty days
following receipt of the initial pleading, regardless of service-must
not be what Congress intended. 0 9 This reasoning is illogical and,
arguably, a usurpation of the legislative function." 0 There is no
doubt that Congress intended to expand slightly the removal period
in New York-type states, but there is no evidence of a generalized
intent to expand the removal period in other states as well."'
summons and the plaintiff's initial pleading is not required to be served or filed until
later.").
106. Pic-Mount Corp. v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (D. Nev. 1989).
107. See Love, 542 F. Supp. at 68 n.3 (citing Kulbeth v. Woolnought, 324 F. Supp. 908,
910 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Benson v. Bradley, 223 F. Supp. 669, 672 (D. Minn. 1963); Maho-
ney v. Witt Ice & Gas Co., 131 F. Supp. 564, 568 (W.D. Mo. 1955)).
108. See id. at 68.
109. Id.
110. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) ("It frustrates rather
than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the stat-
ute's primary purpose must be the law.").
111. "The thirty-day period is mandatory and cannot be extended by consent of the
parties or by order of court." Tyler v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 524 F. Supp. 1211,
1213 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (citing Crompton v. Park Ward Motors, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 699,
701 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Typh, Inc. v. Typhoon Fence, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 994, 996 (E.D. Pa.
1978)). As one court noted:
the notion that Congress' intent was to expand the removal period in any state
[] is directly refuted by its clear language at the end of the amended section
wherein [Congress] stated "whichever is shorter." If Congress had anticipated
an expansion of time through this amendment, [it] would have more appropri-
ately stated "whichever is greater," thereby clearly expressing such intent.
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This leads to the fourth and most interesting "purpose" of the
statute: uniformity. This, of course, had been the overarching pur-
pose of the 1948 amendments making the removal petition a fed-
eral, rather than a state court pleading," 2 but was noted by the Love
court only in passing." 3 By later enacting the "or otherwise" lan-
guage in 1949 to correct the New York and nonresident-motorist
problems, Congress also maintained a uniform trigger for the re-
moval period, that is, receipt of a copy of the initial pleading. As
several courts have noted: "The 1949 amendment sought to elimi-
nate [the] unfairness [of the prior rule as applied under diverse state
procedures] by providing a time limit which would operate with a
greater degree of uniformity throughout the federal system." " 4
At least two courts following the Tyler approach have, however,
shied away from the uniformity rationale, citing the absence of spe-
cific statements in the legislative history to support such a
purpose."15
The problem with this assertion of congressional intent, as
with Love and its progeny, is that it claims too much. While
the language of the statute does suggest a single national
standard based upon notice, the congressional reports ac-
companying the 1949 amendments do not say that state
service rules are irrelevant in determining commencement
of the removal period. Rather, they simply express con-
gressional desire to correct the problems that arose under
the 1948 removal statute and repeat, more or less, the pro-
vision of the statute." 16
This warning notwithstanding, I agree with those cases finding a
goal of uniformity in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), as amended.
First, it is universally conceded that the single most important
intent and effect of the 1948 amendment was to create a more uni-
form trigger for the removal period.' Logically, if the 1949
However, not only did [Congress] not affirmatively express such intent, but [it]
contrarily expressed the opposing view.
Lindley v. DePriest, 755 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69; infra note 116 and accompanying text.
113. See Love, 542 F. Supp. at 67.
114. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 192 F. Supp. 579, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), quoted
in Conticommodity Servs. v. Perl, 663 F. Supp. 27, 30 (N.D. Ill. 1987) and Dawson v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 736 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (D. Colo. 1990).
115. See Pic-Mount Corp. v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1113, 1117 (D. Nev.
1989); Conticommodity, 663 F. Supp. at 30.
116. Conticommodity, 663 F. Supp. at 30 (citations omitted).
117. Subsection (b) makes uniform the time for filing petitions to remove all
civil actions within twenty days after commencement of the action or service of
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amendment was intended to "repeat[] more or less" the statute as it
existed in 1948,"18 then Congress must have retained the goal of
uniformity. Certainly nothing in the language of the 1949 amend-
ment or in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to
discard the more uniform rule created by the amendment adopted
only one year earlier.' 19
Second, a case can be made that the goal of uniformity does
appear, albeit obliquely, in the legislative reports accompanying the
1949 amendment. In this regard, the "Purpose" portion of the Sen-
ate report says that the bill "amends the section prescribing proce-
dure for the removal of cases from State courts so as to make itfit the
diverse procedural laws of the various States .... ,,120 The italicized pas-
sage makes no sense except as a statement of intent to make the
statute uniform for all states by tailoring its language to accommo-
date New York-type jurisdictions. Of a similar nature is the follow-
ing statement: "[i]t is believed that [the 1949 amendment] will meet
the varying conditions of practice in all states."' 12 ' Again, this passage
strongly suggests a congressional intent to create a uniform trigger
that could circumvent the procedural idiosyncracies of any given
state.
The Love holding is in direct conflict with this legislative policy.
Love's reading of the statute, by tying the commencement of the
removal period to the vagaries of state law and the (eventually de-
termined) sufficiency of process, destroys whatever uniformity Con-
process[,] whichever is later, instead of "at any time before the defendant is
required by the laws of the State or the rule of the State court in which such suit
is brought to answer or plead" as required by section 72 of title 28, U.S.C.,
1940 ed. As thus revised, the section will give adequate time and operate uni-
formly throughout the Federal jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b), Reviser's Note to 1948 Act (West 1973).
118. See Conticommodity, 663 F. Supp. at 30.
119. The conclusion that Congress intended to foster uniformity by its 1949 amend-
ment finds further support in the following 1941 description of the then-existing re-
moval provisions:
[t]he removal statute, which is nationwide in its operation, was intended to be
uniform in its application, unaffected by local law definitions or characteriza-
tion of the subject matter to which it is to be applied. Hence, the Act of Con-
gress must be construed as setting up its own criteria, irrespective of local law,
for determining in what instances suits are to be removed from the state to the
federal courts.
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941). Indeed, it may be said
that the entire history of the removal statutes has been to achieve national uniformity. It
is highly unlikely that Congress abandoned this concern in 1949.
120. S. REP. No. 303, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248, 1248
(emphasis added).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
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gress hoped to achieve. In order to adopt the Love position,
therefore, one must conclude that Congress had a policy of uni-
formity in 1948 that it completely abandoned in 1949, despite sev-
eral statements in the legislative reports to the contrary.
The Tyler position, however, fully accords with the four "pur-
poses" outlined above. Following the express words of the statute
in this case does not interfere with congressional goals of solving
the New York and nonresident-motorist-statute problems. More-
over, so long as it is understood that the congressional intent to
"expand the removal period" only applied to states where the re-
moval period could have begun before a defendant ever saw the
complaint, the Tyler position does no harm to that purpose. Finally,
the Tyler approach is the only one to create a uniform thirty-day pe-
riod for defendants in all states. Thus, the most compelling justifi-
cation for rejecting Love in favor of Tyler rests not on rules of
construction, but on the intent of Congress as derived from a care-
ful reading of the language of the statute and the legislative history.
III. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE
The conclusion that the removal period begins upon the receipt
of a courtesy copy of a filed complaint should not be taken as an
endorsement of that result. Countless attorneys have been unneces-
sarily surprised by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Countless hours of court
time and client funds have been wasted in litigating an issue that
should never arise under a rational system of federal jurispru-
dence.122  And countless litigants have inadvertently waived,
through a trivial and understandable mistake, the right of removal
that has been recognized by successive congresses for more than
two hundred years.
Finally, it is unlikely that the circuit courts or the Supreme
Court will have the opportunity to settle the issue on appeal. An-
other portion of the statute prohibits appeal from a remand order
except in rare circumstances,12 3 and thus effectively prevents any
122. As footnotes 6 and 8, supra, indicate, at least 61 cases involving this procedural
anomaly have been decided since the 1949 amendments, and 26 decisions have been
published since 1987. There is no telling how many unpublished district court and mag-
istrate opinions have been decided in that period as well,
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1988) ("An order remanding a case to the State court
from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an
order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to sec-
tion 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.").
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appellate resolution of the matter. 124 The statute has the practical
effect of foreclosing review of an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
unless (1) a motion to remand was denied, (2) the plaintiff subse-
quently lost on the merits, (3) the plaintiff decided to appeal, and
(4) the plaintiff contested the removal issue on appeal. With respect
to the fourth factor, financial and strategic considerations may well
lead a plaintiff not to contest removal because a "favorable" ruling
on that issue would prevent the appellate court from ruling on sub-
stantive issues and throw the case back to "square one" in the state
court.
Having concluded that the federal courts may not escape the
harsh mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and given the unresolvable
split in the case law, I suggest legislative revision. This can be done
in a number of ways. Should Congress feel that uniformity remains
essential, then it should amend the section to say "receipt by the
defendant, at any time and in any manner .... ,25 Conversely, if
fairness to defendants is the paramount concern, the language could
be changed to "receipt by the defendant, through or after formal
service of process....,, 2 6 Although neither of these options is per-
fect, both possess the virtue of simplicity and would, at the least,
resolve the split in the case law on this issue.
There is a more complex middle ground that would remove the
courtesy copy trap while retaining most of the goal of uniformity.
Toward this end, the following language is suggested as a substitute
for the current 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), with revisions in litalics:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall
be filed within thirty days of receipt by the defendant of a
copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief
upon which such action or proceeding is based under any of
the following circumstances: (1) receipt of said copy through orfol-
lowing service of process; (2) receipt, prior to service of process, where
said copy is accompanied by written notice that said receipt com-
mences the removal period under this subsection; or (3) service of
124. See Jerome I. Braun, Reviewability of Remand Orders: Striking the Balance in Favor of
Equality Rather than Judicial Expediency, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 79, 82-84 (1990) (-[B]y
enacting section 1447(d), Congress expressly granted federal district courts virtually
non-reviewable power, presumably in the interests ofjudicial economy and efficiency, to
deprive defendants of their statutory right to have federal district courts adjudicate fed-
eral questions.").
125. As the discussion above makes clear, the author does not prefer this version be-
cause it leads to unnecessary surprise.
126. This approach would essentially codify the Love position. Its drawback, of
course, is its complete destruction of uniformity.
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summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has
then been filed in court and is not required to be served on
the defendant. For the purpose of subsection (b)(1), questions as
to the sufficiency of process shall not affect the commencement of the
removal period.
As revised, subsection (b)(1) of the proposed amendment would es-
sentially restate the Love reading of the current section. It is, how-
ever, qualified by the final sentence of the revised section, which
would ensure that commencement of the removal period is not con-
tingent upon satisfying the service of process laws of the individual
states or, for that matter, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 27
Subsection (b)(2) permits commencement based on receipt of a
courtesy copy, but ensures that the defendant will have written no-
tice that the period is running. Subsection (b)(3) repeats the cur-
rent trigger for New York-type jurisdictions, which do not require
that an initial pleading ever be served on a defendant in a civil
suit. 128
Such an amendment would have the following salutary effects.
First, it would resolve the conflict in the federal courts over the
meaning of this section by striking a compromise between Love and
Tyler. In this regard, the amendment requires a heightened degree
of formality-that is, service, attempted service, written notice, or
summons-to trigger the removal period. This is consistent with
Love. At the same time, the amendment ensures that sufficiency of
process under the various state laws remains irrelevant, as is cur-
rently the case under the Tyler approach. Hopefully, this change will
reduce the litigation generated by this section.
Second, the proposed amendment will be fairer to the litigants
and their counsel. The increased level of formality required to com-
mence the thirty-day period will prevent the kind of surprise exper-
ienced by B's attorney in the opening scenario. In this way, the
statute will ensure that an important right is not lost through the
understandable inadvertence of the defendant's counsel. At the
same time, if A wished to force B into a quick removal decision, he
127. Although it is conceivable that attempted service would be so deficient as to cre-
ate unfairness, such cases would be rare. At the very least, the defendant will have re-
ceived a copy of a filed complaint that, as set forth in the text above, is sufficient under
current law to commence the removal period.
128. In New York, a plaintiff may commence a suit by merely serving the defendant a
summons without a complaint. See, e.g., Sauerzopf v. North America Cement Corp., 93
N.E.2d 617, 618 (N.Y. 1950); Viscosi v. Merritt, 510 N.Y.S.2d 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986);
Henry Sash & Door Co. v. Medi-Complex Ltd., 69 Misc. 2d 269 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1972);
All-O-Matic Mfg. Corp. v. Shields, 59 Misc. 2d 199 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1969).
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could either attempt service or give B a courtesy copy accompanied
by a subsection (b)(2) notice.
Third, the proposed amendment remains substantially consis-
tent with the goal of uniformity. Under subsections (b)(1) and (2),
commencement of the removal period is not contingent upon the
formal commencement of the action under state law. As long as the
defendant receives a copy of the initial pleading either through or
after attempted service, the removal period commences under subsec-
tion (b)(1), whether or not such service is later found to be defec-
tive. This ensures that the trigger remains a federal one.
Of course, the removal period under the proposed revision
would not be as uniform as that under the Receipt Rule, and it is
possible that a considerable amount of time could elapse between
receipt of a copy and the filing of the removal notice. For instance,
at least theoretically, the proposed amendment would permit B to
receive a courtesy copy of a filed complaint without forcing her to
remove the action until some kind of formal service is attempted.
Depending on state laws requiring service within a specified time
after filing, B could have a substantial period of time in which she
need not file a removal petition, even though she knows that she will
remove when the time comes. 1 2 9
I do not see any way to avoid this largely hypothetical difficulty
without re-creating the courtesy copy trap. In any event, I do not
view this marginal breach of the uniformity principle as sufficient to
outweigh the fairness concerns outlined above. Cases of substantial
delay, first of all, will be rare given that, in the vast majority of in-
stances, formal service of process will closely follow the courtesy
copy or other informal receipt. That delay, moreover, is clearly con-
trolled by the plaintiff, who may at any time force the defendant's
hand by utilizing the provisions of the amended subsections (b)(1)
and (2). Accordingly, the plaintiff will not be prejudiced. Moreover,
until the defendant has been served, there is no danger that the case
would proceed in the state court to the prejudice of any party or of
the justice system itself. Finally, I suggest that, where a plaintiff has
filed a complaint but refuses to attempt service, the courtesy copy
129. It should be remembered, however, that, under the current statute, a substantial
amount of time could also elapse. For instance, assume that A simply held up a copy of
the filed complaint and showed it to B. At that point, B would know of the suit and
would probably know whether federal subject matter jurisdiction existed, but she could
wait for months or years to remove (depending on the state) so long as she never "re-
ceived" a copy. This somewhat bizarre scenario simply underscores the difficulty of in-
sisting on an absolutely uniform trigger.
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takes on the character of a threat made for strategic purposes in the
settlement negotiations. A rule that relaxes slightly the defendant's
obligation to remove under these circumstances could save the
courts valuable time and resources in the event that (1) the case is
settled, or (2) the plaintiff allows the filed complaint to lapse in state
court by failing to prosecute.
The current substantial conflict in the cases interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b) is intolerable. Any amendment that serves to re-
solve that conflict while increasing the fairness to litigants is prefera-
ble to the existing confusion. There are more important questions
to litigate.
